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CHINA’S NEW ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: A PERSPECTIVE 
FROM THE UNITED STATES 
Thomas R. Howell, Alan Wm. Wolff, Rachel Howe, and Diane Oh† 
Abstract:  In August 2007, China enacted an Anti-Monopoly Law, becoming one 
of roughly ninety nations to establish a comprehensive regulatory regime governing 
competition.  Since the advent of China’s economic reform program beginning three 
decades ago, China has been moving to integrate its economy within the global trading 
system. This article provides an overview of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) 
emphasizing key areas of significant apparent divergence from U.S. antitrust policy.  The 
article addresses the evolution of anti-monopoly policy in China and the United States, 
observing that, where differences exist, China’s AML frequently reflects principles 
similar to those once embedded in U.S. antitrust policy, but which have been abandoned 
or modified by U.S. policymakers and courts in a sustained process of policymaking 
through trial and error.  The article also examines specific areas of divergence between 
the AML and U.S. antitrust policy, describing how past U.S. policies, which find 
parallels in the AML, were modified or abandoned over time.  Finally, the article 
concludes that in enacting the AML, Chinese policymakers aim to promote economic 
growth and innovation.  It also expresses the hope that the U.S. experience, which was 
driven by the need to increase its own economic dynamism, may serve as an abiding 
point of reference to China’s policymakers. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2007, China enacted an Anti-Monopoly Law, becoming one 
of roughly ninety nations (including the U.S., the European Union, Canada 
and Japan) to establish a comprehensive regulatory regime governing 
competition.1  Since the advent of China’s economic reform program 
                                           
†
 Thomas R. Howell is a partner at Dewey & LeBoeuf, in its Washington D.C. office.  He 
has practiced in international trade matters for more than 20 years. His practice includes litigation 
pursuant to the U.S. trade remedies; support for international negotiations; and securing market 
access abroad.  A particular area of experience has been developing and analyzing comprehensive 
information about industrial policies, private commercial practices and economic systems outside 
the United States.  Alan Wolff is also a partner at Dewey & LeBoeuf and leads its International 
Trade Practice Group.  He also served as United States Deputy Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations (1977–1979) in the Carter Administration, holding the rank of ambassador, after 
having served as General Counsel of the agency from 1974–1977.  The International Trade 
Practice Group is active in efforts to limit trade-distorting practices such as dumping and 
subsidies, private anticompetitive practices, violations of intellectual property rights and trade-
related investment performance requirements.  Rachel Howe is an international research advisor 
at Dewey & LeBoeuf.  Diane Oh is an international trade specialist at Dewey & LeBoeuf.   
1
  Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, 
effective Aug. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (P.R.C.), available at http://www. 
lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=6351&keyword=monopoly [hereinafter AML]. 
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beginning three decades ago, China has been moving to integrate its 
economy within the global trading system. 
In contrast to China’s World Trade Organization (“WTO”) accession, 
no established global framework of rules exists with respect to competition 
policy, reflecting a lack of global consensus on the goals and methods of 
competition policy enforcement.2  National competition regimes and policies 
differ substantially.  Accordingly, in enacting anti-monopoly legislation, 
China could not─even if it had so chosen─conform its competition policy 
regime to a single unitary system of multilateral norms.  For China, 
divergence from at least some national competition regimes has been 
inescapable. 
This article provides an overview of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law 
(“AML”) with emphasis on key areas of significant apparent divergence 
from U.S. antitrust policy.  Part II of this article addresses the evolution of 
anti-monopoly policy in China and the United States, observing that where 
differences exist, China’s AML frequently reflects principles similar to those 
once embedded in U.S. antitrust policy, which have been abandoned or 
modified by U.S. policymakers and courts in a sustained process of 
policymaking through trial and error.  In general, U.S. antitrust policy has 
evolved from a system of regulation based on political, social, and 
ideological considerations to one premised on modern economic principles.  
Part III examines specific areas of divergence between the AML and U.S. 
antitrust policy, describing how past U.S. policies, which find parallels in the 
AML, were modified or abandoned over time.  Particular emphasis is given 
to U.S. antitrust policies which came to be seen as impediments to economic 
growth, such as the antitrust treatment of agreements constituting so-called 
“per se” violations (II.A), dominant market position (II.B), intellectual 
property rights (II.C), and differential treatment of various industries as a 
result of their relationships with government organizations (II.D, E and F).  
Part IV concludes that in enacting the AML, Chinese policymakers aim to 
promote economic growth and innovation.  It also expresses the hope that 
the U.S. experience, which was driven by the need to increase its own 
economic dynamism, may serve as an abiding point of reference to China’s 
policymakers. 
                                           
2
  See generally Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 911 
(2003). 
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II. EVOLUTION OF ANTI-MONOPOLY POLICY IN CHINA AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
In both China and the United States, the enactment of anti-monopoly 
legislation was characterized by uncertainty and lack of consensus.  It has 
taken nearly a century for the United States to arrive at a workable solution.  
While China will undoubtedly find its own path, as the U.S. academic Hans 
B. Thorelli observed in the Preface to his magisterial history of the early 
evolution of U.S. antitrust doctrine, “other nations and international bodies 
considering measures to repress of control monopoly should stand to gain” 
by studying the evolution of U.S. antitrust policy.3 
A. Background of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law 
In 1978, China’s leaders launched the country on a program of long-
run economic reform, emphasizing the introduction of market-based 
principles, enterprise autonomy, private ownership, and entrepreneurialism.4  
Prior to these reforms, although government-owned and run factories and 
other economic units competed to achieve production quotas and other goals 
set by central planners, Western-style profit-driven competition between 
enterprises for markets was virtually unknown.5  After these reforms, 
however, a dynamic private sector emerged in many economic sectors.6  
Competition among enterprises not only became widespread, but frequently 
took on such an intensity that Chinese observers characterized it as 
“malignant,” “malicious,” and “excessive.”7  In 1993, China adopted an 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law to place curbs on certain kinds of competitive 
excesses, such as deceptive advertising, coercive sales, appropriation of 
business secrets, and bribery.8  However, China’s leadership saw the need for 
more comprehensive anti-monopoly legislation as a key element in the 
                                           
3
  HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 
vii (1955). 
4
  The reform program was initiated at the Eleventh Central Committee Communist Party Plenum in 
December 1978. 
5
  Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for 
Competition Regime?, 24 NW J. INT’L L. AND BUS. 107, 110 (2003). 
6
  See Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-
Monopoly Law and Beyond 10 (Stanford Inst. for Policy Research, SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 06-32, 
2007), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/06-32.pdf. 
7
  Id. at 19. 
8
  Id. at 4. 
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creation of the sort of sophisticated civil legal system necessary to support 
the functioning of a market economy.9 
China’s State Council called for enactment of Anti-Monopoly 
legislation in the late 1980s, and drafting of what was to become the Anti-
Monopoly Law began in 1994.10  The Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) 
emerged as the principal drafting agency, although many other governmental 
organizations were consulted.11  The officials involved in the drafting 
consulted extensively with foreign competition officials, academics, 
attorneys, and business executives.  The U.S. Department of Justice, the 
Federal Trade Commission, the American Bar Association, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, and other U.S. organizations reviewed and 
commented extensively on various drafts of the AML and held a series of 
legal exchanges and conferences with Chinese officials involved in the 
drafting process.12  International bodies such as the World Bank, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International 
Bar Association, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development were consulted.13  The Chinese government reviewed the draft 
law with public and private sector experts in the European Union, Japan and 
Korea.14  Commentators believed that these extensive consultations resulted 
in substantial improvements in the law that was ultimately enacted.15 
                                           
9
  Between 2000 and 2004, China promulgated 94,288 laws and regulations, triple the number from 
the preceding four-year period.  These include a recently-enacted Property Code, a Labor Contract Law, 
and individual and corporate tax codes.  As of 2005, China had admitted 114,471 lawyers to practice 
(compared with 6,218 in 1981), many of them with advanced degrees.  Business Week observed in 2007 
that “virtually every area of business life in China is now covered by a modern statute or regulation.”  
China Makes Remarkable Progress in Civil Law Making, XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET] (Dec. 4, 2007), 
http://en.ce.cn/National/Local/200712/05/t20071205_13816882.shtml#. 
10
  H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 169, 175 (2006). 
11
  Id. at 175-80. 
12
  Id. at 181. 
13
  Nathan Bush, The PRC Anti-Monopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, THE 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2007, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/Oct07-
Bush10-18f.pdf. 
14
  Harris, supra note 10, at 181. 
15
  See id. at 228-9; Federal Trade Commission Chariman Deborah Platt Majoras commented in 2007 
after enactment of the AML: “We have been pleased with the opportunities afforded to the U.S. antitrust 
agencies to provide our views, and we have taken advantage of that through frequent high-level contacts, 
including my trip to Beijing last year and a recent training program for Chinese staff involved in merger 
review . . . .  The Anti-Monopoly Law reflects many suggestions from the U.S. agencies, which also were 
consistent with recommendations of [European Union] DG-Camp and others.”  Deborah Platt Majoras, 
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Fordham Law School 34th Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Convergence, Conflict and Comity: The Search for Coherence in 
International Competition Policy (Sept. 27, 2007). 
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B. The U.S. Perspective on Antitrust 
No country, including the United States, can claim to have a perfect 
competition policy system, but the U.S. has a far longer history of 
implementing anti-monopoly legislation than any other country, and its 
policymakers and academics have grappled at great length with certain basic 
questions that confront any government seeking to regulate competition.  
The U.S. experience, including what are now generally regarded as U.S. 
mistakes, has referential value for China today. 
The original U.S. anti-monopoly legislation, the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890 (“Sherman Act”), was enacted by Congress as a response to 
public agitation against “trusts” and “big business.”16  Although the Sherman 
Act governed commercial relationships, professional economists were not 
consulted in any meaningful way during the drafting of the law and, for 
many decades, it was unclear whether antitrust had a coherent underlying 
economic rationale.17  The evolution of U.S. antitrust policy is a checkered 
saga in which a variety of political, social, moral and ideological 
considerations gradually gave way to a rational system of commercial 
regulation based on widely-accepted, modern economic principles.18 
While China will pursue its own course in implementing anti-
monopoly policy, its policymakers must address the same fundamental 
questions that have confronted U.S. antitrust policymakers since 1890:  
should competition policy try to protect small businesses from competitive 
pressure by large firms?  What should government policy be when intense 
competition results in the emergence of a single dominant enterprise?  In 
other words, is monopoly itself intrinsically pernicious?  Should innovators 
be allowed to monopolize their inventions for a limited time, or should they 
be compelled to share them with actual and potential rivals?  Should certain 
areas of the economy be sheltered from competition law enforcement?  Do 
the answers to all these questions have a bearing on overall economic 
growth and international competitiveness? 
                                           
16
  See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, at ix-
xvii (Free Press 1993) (1978); see also Thomas B. Leary, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at the 
Western Economic Association: Antitrust Economics: Three Cheers and Two Challenges (July 7, 2001), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learythreecheers.htm; see also J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at the International Bar Association Antitrust Section Conference: I Say 
Monopoly, You Say Dominance: The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of Dominant Firms, is it the 
Economics? 5-10 (Sept. 8, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070908isay 
monopolyba.pdf; see also William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the 
Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1423-30, 1445-46 (1990). 
17
  Id. 
18
  Id. 
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To the extent that the evolution of U.S. antitrust policy offers a lesson 
of universal applicability, it is that competition policy can serve either as a 
brake or a stimulus to economic growth.  Arguably the Sherman Act and 
subsequent U.S. antitrust laws were intended as much as a political 
constraint on the power of big business as a system of rational economic 
regulation.19  As one professor of antitrust law reportedly said, the 
government should “eschew policy analysis and just keep bringing lawsuits 
in order to keep businessmen ‘shook up.’”20  Not surprisingly, U.S. antitrust 
policy was often criticized by economists as irrational and an impediment to 
economic growth and innovation. 
Fundamental reappraisals of U.S. antitrust policy have coincided with 
serious economic crises.  In the 1970s, the U.S. economy was struggling 
with economic “stagflation,” a seemingly intractable mix of low productivity 
growth, inflation, and declining rates of innovation, and antitrust policy 
came under scrutiny as a contributing factor.  In the preceding four decades, 
U.S. antitrust policy had emphasized the curtailment and even breakup of 
“dominant” firms and the imposition by the courts of severe limits on the 
free exercise of intellectual property rights.21  IBM, a world-class high 
technology firm, was the target of one of the largest lawsuits ever 
undertaken by the federal government.  In retrospect, it is recognized that as 
former Deputy Assistant head of the Antitrust Division, William Kolasky, 
expressed it, “pursuit of these types of antitrust policies contributed . . . to 
the stagflation we experienced during the 1970s.”22 
By the 1970s, an intensive intellectual reexamination of U.S. antitrust 
policy, which began in the 1950s at the University of Chicago, had led new 
perspectives to emerge which subsequently found expression in U.S. judicial 
decisions, legislation, and antitrust policy.23  The new U.S. thinking on 
                                           
19
  As a former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission observed in 2001, “up to relatively recent 
times there was a rigorous debate about possible alternative sources [to economic consideration] for 
antitrust decisions, like dispersion of political power, wealth transfer effects, and various social 
considerations.”  Leary, supra note 16.  
20
  BORK supra note 16.  Another attorney, who later was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
reportedly characterized antitrust as “in the good old American tradition of the sheriff of a frontier town: he 
did not sift through evidence, distinguish between suspects, and solve crimes, but merely walked the main 
street and every so often pistol-whipped a few people.”  Id. at 6.  
21
  See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic Thinking, 14 J. 
OF ECON. PERSP. 43, 50-52 (2000), in David M. Hart, Antitrust and Technological Innovation, ISSUES IN 
SCI. AND TECH. (Winter 1998), http://www.issues.org/15.2/hart.htm. 
22
  William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Int’l Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Address at the Tokyo America Center: The Role of Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets 
and Economic Growth (Nov. 12, 2002). 
23
  See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
925 (1979). 
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antitrust was based on economic principles rather than the social, moral, and 
ideological considerations that had until then comprised important 
underpinnings of U.S. antitrust policy.  The new interpretations of antitrust 
law “precipitated a sea change . . . .  ‘In the 1960s through the 1980s 
[antitrust scholars generally associated with the University of Chicago] 
explained how many market structures and practices that antitrust treated 
with hostility could be beneficial.’”24  One observer later commented that 
“[t]he closest approximation to a pure triumph of ideas in regulatory policy 
was the revolution in antitrust incited by the work [of the Chicago School 
and its adherents].”25 
The Chicago School perspective on antitrust rejected former notions 
that “big is bad,” that any particular class of competitors (such as small 
businesses) should be protected by the antitrust laws, or that innovators 
should be compelled to share their inventions with competitors.  The sole 
purpose of antitrust, it was argued, should be to promote economic 
efficiency for the benefit of consumers26—and if such benefits were 
promoted by dominant or even monopoly enterprises, there should be no 
inconsistency with a U.S. antitrust law.  These concepts won wide 
acceptance and are now firmly embedded in U.S. antitrust law and policy.  
Arguably the new policies played a role in restoring robust U.S. economic 
growth after the 1970s.27  In decades the U.S. witnessed the appearance of 
dynamic new high technology industries, a veritable explosion in U.S. 
innovation, and the emergence of an array of new world class technology-
intensive firms which are the envy of other countries, including China. 
                                           
24
  ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (2007) (quoting 
GELLHORN ET. AL., ANTITRUST L. AND ECON. 105 (5th ed. 2004)). 
25
  BORK, supra note 16, at xii-xiii (quoting Christopher DeMuth). 
26
  BORK, supra note 16, at 427. 
27
 In Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)), the Supreme Court declared that the “antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the 
protection of competition not competitors.”  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine why the 
Chicago School approach won such complete and comparatively rapid acceptance by U.S. courts, 
policymakers, and the public, a number of analysts have pointed out that the popular hostility toward big 
business that once animated the antitrust movement had largely died out, as had the antitrust movement 
itself; see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID 
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 188 et. seq. (1965); see also Daniel Scroop, A Faded Passion? Estes 
Keufauver and the Sen., Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, 5 BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY ON-
LINE (2007), http://www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2007/scroop.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2008); 
see also William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust 
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989). 
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C. Synopsis of China’s New Law  
China’s AML was enacted August 30, 2007 and became effective on 
August 1, 2008.28  Like U.S. antitrust statutes, China’s AML is short and 
broadly worded, with the interpretation and application of specific 
prohibitions left to be determined by subsequent implementing regulations 
and decisions of the enforcement authorities.29 
The AML governs “monopolistic conduct” in China and outside of 
China to the extent that such conduct “eliminates or restricts competition in 
China.”30  Monopolistic conduct can take three forms: (1) monopoly 
agreements between undertakings;31 (2) abuse of a dominant market position 
by undertakings;32 and (3) concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) that 
eliminate or restrict competition.33  These three forms of “monopolistic 
conduct” are prohibited and subject to civil penalties unless an exemption is 
provided pursuant to the AML.  There is no criminal liability under the 
AML. 
The stated purposes of China’s AML are to prevent and prohibit 
“monopolistic conduct,” to protect “fair market competition,” to promote 
“economic efficiency,” to safeguard the interests of consumers, and to 
“promote the healthy development of the socialist market economy.”34  
Earlier versions of China’s AML stated that the purpose of the law included 
“protecting the legitimate rights and interests of undertakings [e.g. 
competitors] consumers and public interest, and promoting healthy 
development of the socialist market economy.”35  The final version of the 
law as enacted eliminated protection of “undertakings” as a stated purpose of 
the law.  However, a number of provisions in the law suggest that 
notwithstanding this change in Article 1, the AML may in some cases be 
applied to protect one group of competitors against another in order to 
                                           
28
  AML, supra note 1. 
29
  The rationale of the U.S. Congress with respect to this broad approach was explained by an 
eminent U.S. political scientist as follows: “[I]t is very likely that, with its broadly worded prohibition of 
conspiracies in restraint of trade and of efforts to monopolize, Congress was attempting to lay down a 
declaration of policy that would serve as a guide to future action in much the same flexible way as the 
Constitution itself had served the country after 1787.”  HOFSTADTER, supra note 27, at 199.  
30
  AML, supra note 1, art. 2.  
31
  Id. at art. 3(i).  
32
  Id. at art. 3(ii). 
33
  Id. at art. 3(iii). 
34
  Id. at art. 1. 
35
  Draft Anti-Monopoly Law transmitted to the National People’s Congress, June 7, 2006, Art. 1 
(emphasis added). 
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further industrial policy objectives.36  If this occurs it would diverge from 
current U.S. practice, which is enforced to protect “competition not 
competitors” and has the sole objective of maximizing consumer benefits by 
promoting economic efficiency. 
By its terms China’s AML makes no distinction between domestic and 
foreign enterprises, and following enactment of the AML, Chinese officials 
have given extensive assurances to the effect that the new AML is not aimed 
at foreign firms.37  However, in the policy debates accompanying the 
drafting of the AML, Chinese officials often cited the need for the AML to 
serve as a foil against foreign multinationals that sought to dominate or 
monopolize China’s market.38  During the course of National People’s 
Congress (“NPC”) deliberations on the AML in 2006, various NPC Standing 
Committee members indicated that promulgation of the AML would “strike 
multinationals behavior restricting competition such as control of market 
                                           
36
  AML, supra note 1, art. 17(i) (a prohibition in the new law on “dominant” undertakings “buying 
products at unfairly low prices” found in Article 17(i) seems intended only to protect competitors, not 
consumers.); see AML, supra note 1, art. 15(v) (similarly an exemption from the prohibition on monopoly 
agreements “for the purpose of mitigating a severe decrease in sales volume or excessive overstock during 
economic recessions” found in Art. 15(v) can only benefit undertakings and is actually disadvantageous to 
consumers.).  In light of such ambiguities in the AML, it remains to be seen how Chinese policymakers will 
interpret the purpose of the law. 
37
  MOFCOM made this point in its Foreign Investment Report 2007.  Zhang Qiang of the State 
Council’s Legislative Affairs Office said that “the Anti-Monopoly Law regulates mergers and acquisitions, 
and is the same for domestic [enterprises] and foreign-invested [enterprises].  It does not give the domestic 
[enterprises] a way out, and does not put the screw on foreign-invested [enterprises].” Guo wu yuan fa zhi 
ban fan long duan fa bu ying xiang qi ye zheng dang bing gou [Legislative Affairs Office of the State 
Council: Anti-Monopoly Law Does not Affect Normal Mergers and Acquisitions of Enterprises], XINHUA 
WANG [XINHUA NET] (Sept. 10, 2007), http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-09/10/content_ 
6699043.htm (P.R.C.); see also Gong shang zong ju fan long duan shen cha bu cun zai dui wai zi de te bie 
yao qiu [State Administration of Industry and Commerce: Anti-Monopoly Investigation not Specific to 
Foreign Investors], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET] (Dec. 13, 2007), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
newscenter/2007-12/13/content_7244074.htm (P.R.C.); see also.Ren Siqiang, Zhuan jia fan bo shang wu 
bu wai zi long duan xian xiang yi chu xian zai ge bie hang ye [Experts Refute Ministry of Commerce: 
Foreign Monopoly Already Appears in Some Industries], BEIJING BUSINESS TODAY, Sept. 10, 2007 
(Ministry of Finance asserts there is no foreign monopolization of domestic industries), available at 
http://xinping.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/dongtai/200709/20070905076714.html; Zhuan jia cheng fan long 
duan fa wu fa zhen dong guo qi long duan di wei [Experts Say AML Cannot Shake the Monopoly Position 
of SOEs], Di yi cai jing ri bao [The First Financial and Economic Daily], Sept. 13, 2007 (P.R.C.) (debating 
how the AML may affect state-owned monopolies).  
38
  China’s State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) warned in 2004: “[C]ompared 
with China’s domestic enterprises, multinational companies possess great competitive advantages with 
respect to technology, size, capital, etc.  As a result, it is much easier for them to obtain a dominant and 
even a monopoly position in the Chinese market.”  Off. of Anti-Monopoly, Fair Trade Bureau, State 
Admin. of Indus. and Com., Zai hua kua guo gong si xian zhi jing zheng xing wei biao xian ji dui ce 
[Anticompetitive Practices of Multinational Companies in China and Countermeasures], 2004.4 Gong 
shang xing zheng guan li [Biweekly of Administration for Industry and Commerce] 42, 42 (2004), 
available by subscription at www.cnki.net.    
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price and product quality, and abuse of market dominance . . . .”39 More 
specifically cited as a concern was the “monopoly behavior of multinationals 
in China, such as in computer operating systems, photographic material, 
tires, network equipment, cameras, soft packaging, etc.”40 
Even as Chinese leadership debated anti-monopoly legislation, some 
Chinese lawmakers argued that the AML would provide a solution to a 
specific issue at the time — the takeover and intellectual property rights 
(“IPR”) dispute involving a domestic Chinese beverage manufacturer, 
Wahaha, and the French food company Danone (known as Dannon in the 
U.S.).  The Wahaha chairman, Zong Qinghou, was also an NPC member and 
argued in NPC testimony that special mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) 
provisions should be incorporated in the AML41 to address certain 
challenges posed by foreign firms.42  Wahaha was the target of a takeover 
bid by Danone which was simultaneously charging Wahaha with 
inappropriate use of trademark.43  After the Wahaha discussion, another NPC 
member, Li Guoguang—a member of the NPC Legal Committee and a vice-
president of the Supreme People's Court44—commented that an AML 
proceeding might eventually result: “launching anti-monopoly investigations 
against Danone and seeking legal measures to break its monopolized status 
                                           
39
  Fa yan zhai deng fan long duan fa cao an [Speech Excerpts: Draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law], 
June 30, 2006 [hereinafter Speech Excerpts] (collecting excerpts of various members of the Tenth Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, including Cong Bin and He Yicheng, quoted here), 
http://cms.npc.gov.cn:87/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=1&nodeid=3064&articleid=350218&type=1 . 
40
  Id. (summarizing the speech of Jiang Zhuping).  One member of the Standing Committee, Vice 
Chairman Cheng Siwei, noted “there are two major target categories of the Anti-Monopoly Law.  One is 
state-owned enterprises, and the other foreign enterprises.”  Id. Zheng Gongcheng noted “[a] market 
economy must fight against monopoly, but at the present stage we need to protect our enterprises so as to 
expand their market shares.  Besides, so long as foreign trade is concerned, we need price fixing to a certain 
extent to remove ruinous competition and safeguard our national interests.  A balance must be properly 
kept on the one hand to help our enterprises keep expanding and increasing market share, and gain 
advantageous position in international competition, and on the other hand to fight monopoly.”  Id.  
41
  Zong Qinghou, Zong Qinghou guan yu li fa xian zhi wai zi tong guo bing gou long duan wo guo 
ge ge hang ye wei hu jing ji an quan de ti an [Zong Qinghou’s Proposal on Legislation Restricting Foreign 
Investment from Monopolizing Various Industries in China Through Mergers and Acquisitions and 
Maintaining Economic Security], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET] (Mar. 14, 2007), http://news.xinhuanet. 
com/video/2007-03/14/content_5845841.htm. 
42
  Zheng quan shi bao [SECURITIES TIMES], Wahaha dong shi zhang Zong Qinghou ying tong guo li 
fa xian zhi wai zi e yi bing gou [Chairman of Wahaha: Use Legislation to Restrict Hostile Mergers and 
Acquisitions by Foreign Investment] (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://www.p5w.net/today/ 
200703/t826564.htm; see Zong, supra note 41.  
43
  See Lan Xinzhen, Wahaha vs. Danone, 51 BEIJING REVIEW 23, 23 et. seq. (2007), available at 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/business/txt/2007-06/04/content_65226.htm. 
44
  Biography of Li Guoguang, National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 
www.npc.gov.cn/npc/bmzz/falv/node_1622.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).  
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according to international practice could eventually occur.”45  Such 
statements suggest that the AML is viewed as having special implications for 
foreign firms in China.  
If the AML is employed in a manner that singles out foreign 
enterprises, Chinese practice will diverge from that of the United States.  
The U.S. does have various statutory and regulatory schemes that treat 
foreign enterprises in a differential manner, reflecting concerns such as 
national security, international trade policy, and consumer protection.46  
However, the sole purpose of U.S. antitrust policy is to safeguard 
competition in U.S. commerce without regard to the nationality of individual 
competitors. 
III. A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON POINTS OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE AML 
AND U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY 
In bilateral U.S.-China discussions during the drafting phase of the 
AML, U.S. officials often pointed out differences between current U.S. 
antitrust policy and certain aspects of China’s emerging AML.  It was less 
commonly observed that China appeared to be adopting policies that closely 
resembled past U.S. antitrust ideas and doctrines that have been abandoned.  
Chinese policymakers may find it useful to consider what the U.S. now 
regard as “wrong turns” in its own anti-monopoly experience as they begin 
to define their own anti-monopoly policies. 
A. Monopoly Agreements  
China’s AML prohibits “monopoly agreements” between 
undertakings.47  The types of prohibited agreements are very similar to 
                                           
45
  Li reportedly said that “during the past decade Danone has acquired many well-known Chinese 
beverage companies, including Wahaha . . .” and that “Danone is actually monopolizing China’s beverage 
industry . . . .”  Lan, supra note 43.  Although the two parties reportedly agreed to resolve their differences 
amicably, it is not clear that they have actually done so.  Mure Dickie, Danone and Wahaha Agree Truce, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec 24, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/edc8a52e-b186-11dc-9777-0000779fd2ac. 
html?nclick_check=1. 
46
  Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 codified at 
50 U.S.C. § 2170 (2007) (providing authority for the President to suspend or prohibit any foreign 
acquisition, merger or takeover of a U.S. corporation that is determined to threaten the national security of 
the United States).  For a comprehensive synopsis of U.S. federal and state laws treating foreign enterprises 
in a differential manner in areas which include air and maritime transportation, insurance communications, 
banking, public utilities, agriculture, energy and mining, see ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., 
NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES: LIST OF MEASURES REPORTED FOR 
TRANSPARENCY 83-91 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/46/38273182.pdf. 
47
  AML, supra note 1, art. 13 and 14. 
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certain anticompetitive combinations that have traditionally been prohibited 
under U.S. antitrust law (with the exception of the restriction on purchasing 
new technologies, which is an outlier here).  If applied throughout China’s 
economy, as is the practice in the U.S., a number of these prohibitions are 
likely to enhance competition, benefit consumers, and increase efficiency 
throughout China’s economy.  Specific prohibitions include: agreements 
involving price fixing;48 restricting output or sales volume;49 division of 
sales markets or raw materials purchasing markets;50 restrictions on 
purchasing of new technology or new facilities, or the development of new 
technologies or products;51 joint boycotts;52 fixing the price for resale to a 
third party;53 restricting the minimum price for resale to a third party;54 and 
other monopoly agreements confirmed by the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement 
Authority.55 
Several of the prohibitions in the AML are paralleled by prohibitions 
under U.S. antitrust law, which holds that practices such as price-fixing,56 
big-rigging57 and collective restraints58 on output or sales are illegal “per 
se”—that is, never justified under any circumstances.  U.S. courts have 
dramatically curtailed the range of other commercial practices once deemed 
per se illegal, however, reflecting the application of modern economic 
principles.59  Beginning with a landmark Supreme Court decision in 
Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,60 
[T]he Court systematically went about the task of dismantling 
many of the per se rules it had created in the prior fifty years, 
and increasingly turned to modern economic theory to inform 
its interpretation and application of the Sherman Act . . . .  Rule 
                                           
48
  Id. at art. 13(i). 
49
  Id. at art. 13(ii). 
50
  Id. at art. 13(iii). 
51
  Id. at art. 13(iv). 
52
  Id. at art. 13(v). 
53
  Id. at art. 14(i). 
54
  Id. at art. 14(ii). 
55
  Id. at art. 13(vi) and 14(iii). 
56
  See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940); see also United States v. 
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927). 
57
  See United States v. Misle Bus. & Equip. Co., 967 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing United 
States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 589 (8th Cir. 1970)). 
58
  See United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 389-90 (1923); see also United 
States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 666-669 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1014 (2000). 
59
  See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007) (ruling that 
resale price maintenance agreements, long regarded as illegal “per se,” are to be subject to “rule of reason” 
analysis, meaning that their anticompetitive effects must be balanced against pro-competitive 
considerations, and that in some cases such agreements may not be unlawful).   
60
  433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977). 
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of reason analysis allows this examination of potential 
efficiency rationales for challenged conduct.  Although there 
are exceptions, of course, the use of per se rules of automatic 
illegality is now substantially reduced, replaced by a more 
discriminating analysis under the rule of reason.61 
China’s antitrust policymakers may wish to study recent U.S. decisions with 
respect to commercial practices prohibited under Articles 14 and 15 of the 
AML.  Too sweeping an application of conclusive, “per se” presumptions of 
illegality could penalize some forms of efficiency-enhancing commercial 
behavior, to the detriment of the economy and consumers. 
B. Abuse of Dominance 
An important area in which China’s AML and current U.S. antitrust 
policy diverge is the treatment of enterprises with so-called “dominant” 
market positions.  Under U.S. law, market dominance by one company 
commonly reflects that entity’s superior efficiency, innovative ability and 
competitiveness.  U.S. antitrust policy does not regard such enterprises as 
necessarily problematic because of their market position alone, and 
recognizes that their competitive acts—even if highly aggressive—are 
usually pro-competition.62  Antitrust liability arises only when “specific 
conduct, in a particular market situation, undermines the competitive process 
by allowing a dominant firm to strengthen or preserve its market dominant 
position.”63  By contrast, China’s AML subjects dominant enterprises to 
heightened scrutiny and prohibits a number of commercial practices that 
would be considered normal in the U.S. 
Although current U.S. antitrust law does not expressly recognize the 
notion of abuse of a dominant market position, the original U.S. antitrust 
movement was driven by a popular antipathy to large firms that dominated 
markets and, in some cases, monopolized them—sentiments similar to those 
                                           
61
  ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 36. 
62
  Zheng Gongcheng, member of the NPC Standing Committee, expressed this perspective as 
follows: “I think we should encourage our companies to try to expand their market share.  Within this 
context, are companies with a dominant market position alleged monopolists?  I think we should be more 
cautious . . . .  [W]hether an abuse exists should not be decided according to market share, but in the 
manner that administrative power is exercised . . . .  [A] company should not be regarded as an alleged 
monopolist simply because it gets a large market share.  Otherwise it would not be conducive to the 
development and growth of our companies.”  Speech Excerpts, supra note 39.    
63
 Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Address Before the University of International Business & Economics Competition Law Center 
Conference on Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice:  Some Comments on the Abuse-of-Dominance 
Provisions of China’s Draft Anti-Monopoly Law 6 (July 21, 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov 
/atr/public/speeches/225357.pdf. 
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expressed in the recent Chinese debates over anti-monopoly legislation.  The 
populist U.S. politician William Jennings Bryan gave voice to what was 
once a common popular sentiment when he said in 1899 that “[t]here is no 
good monopoly in private hands.  There can be no good monopoly in private 
hands until the Almighty sends us angels to preside over the monopoly.”64  
For generations this perspective found expression in U.S. antitrust policy 
and judicial decisions, which were infused with subjective moral judgments 
regarding large enterprises.  Justice Louis Brandeis, who served on the U.S. 
Supreme Court from 1916 through 1939, epitomized the view that “bigness” 
in business was a “curse” which it was necessary to curb through the 
application of antitrust.  Brandeis believed that: 
The idea of concentrating and specializing in one area . . . was 
wrong.  Each state, each city, each village should be partially 
self-sufficient; industry and agriculture should be balanced; and 
the whole trend toward urban centralization and absentee 
control should be checked.  The nation, in other words, should 
try to recapture some of the enduring values of its rural 
upbringing, recognize that Big Business and High Finance were 
false gods, and get back to a simpler and more satisfying 
system. 
The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee commented in 1936 that 
new antitrust legislation was necessary because “we must make some effort 
to maintain the yeomanry in business.” 
The Brandeis “big is bad” perspective found many adherents in the 
courts and successive U.S. administrations from the presidency of Franklin 
Roosevelt onward.  Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, a Roosevelt 
appointee and an admirer of Brandeis who authored many antitrust opinions, 
stated in 1948 that: 
[S]ize can become a menace both industrial and social.  It can 
be an industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities 
against existing or putative competitors . . . .  Industrial power 
should be decentralized.  It should be scattered into many hands 
so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the 
whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability 
of a few self-appointed men.  The fact that they are not vicious 
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  CIVIC FEDERATION OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS, SPEECHES, DEBATES, 
RESOLUTIONS, LIST OF DELEGATES, ETC. 497 (1900). 
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men but respectable and social minded is irrelevant.  That is the 
philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act.65 
Through the early 1970s U.S. antitrust embodied a hostility toward 
large enterprises with strong market positions, like “dominant” enterprises.  
A wide range of commercial practices were designated as “illegal per se,” 
meaning that they could not be justified regardless of circumstances,66 and 
courts “grew more willing to find that dominant firms had acted 
improperly.”67  In a 1962 decision, the Supreme Court disallowed a merger 
that would have produced a firm with a market share of 5 percent, citing 
Congress’ “desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, 
small, locally-owned business.”68  Thomas B. Leary, a Federal Trade 
Commissioner, has observed that “[until the early 1970s] antitrust lawyers 
and judges did not pay much attention to economics, and the economics they 
did apply tended to be wrong.”69  Efficiencies were suspect, for example, 
and monopolists were not supposed to compete very hard.70  
But in the 1970s, U.S. economic growth and productivity stagnated, 
while annual inflation rates reached double-digit levels.  As policymakers 
searched for a way out of stagflation and economic malaise, U.S. 
competition policy came under withering criticism, particularly from the 
Chicago economists.71  They emphasized the efficiencies and consumer 
benefits that large-scale enterprises—including near or outright 
monopolies—bring to an economy when they resulted from scale economies 
and superior innovation and efficiency.72  One prominent critic of U.S. 
antitrust policy characterized the emphasis on decentralization and 
protection of small businesses as superficially attractive, but ultimately a 
reflection of social and political values reflecting “a jumble of half-digested 
                                           
65
 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535-36 (1948) (Douglas, J.,dissenting); see also 
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 542 (1973) (Douglas, J. concurring) (Douglas 
complained that the rise of large corporations transferred business decisionmaking from local entrepreneurs 
to “distant cities where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and loss statements before 
them decide the fate of communities with which they have no relationship [and] responsible entrepreneurs 
in counties and states are replaced by clerks.”) 
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  Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 50. 
67
  See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(complaining that the sole consistency he could see in Supreme Court decisions blocking mergers leading 
to dominance was that “the Government [seeking to block a merger] always wins”); see also Kovacic & 
Shapiro, supra note 21, at 51-52 (during this era, economists and the courts “tended to downplay 
efficiencies associated with large-scale enterprises”). 
68
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); see also Kovacic & Shapiro, supra 
note 21, at 51. 
69
  Leary, supra note 16. 
70
  Id. 
71
  BORK, supra note 16. 
72
  Id. 
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notions and mythologies” rather than rational economic thought.73  The 
Chicago perspective began to win acceptance in U.S. courts, in part, because 
of “a sense that U.S. firms were losing ground in international markets and 
surrendering market share at home.  This perception increased sensitivity to 
efficiency arguments.”74  
Today, a widely dispersed Chicago School perspective provides the 
underpinning for U.S. antitrust policy in the competition agencies and the 
courts.  Big is no longer bad, nor is market dominance or even monopoly.  
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) General Counsel William Blumenthal 
expressed current U.S. antitrust thinking with respect to dominant firms: 
Innovation, economic growth, and vigorous competition would 
be stifled if the law were to punish successful market 
participants who achieve a dominant or monopoly position . . . .  
[E]ven firms with monopoly power are permitted to compete 
aggressively on the merits, even if a collateral effect is a bad 
outcome for their competitors.  Competition is a rigorous 
process, and it will inevitably yield both winners and losers.  If 
a firm is more efficient and can thereby reduce costs and 
expand sales at the expense of its less-efficient competitors, our 
competition laws are not infringed.75  
China’s AML “abuse-of-dominance” provisions bear a closer 
resemblance to U.S. antitrust policies of the 1940s through the 1960s than to 
current policy.  “Dominance” may be found even in situations where a firm 
confronts vigorous competition.  Like the old U.S. policy the AML appears 
to contemplate a web of constraints that will bind large efficient enterprises 
and limit an array of commercial practices that would otherwise enhance 
competition and benefit consumers.  In implementing the AML provisions 
regarding market dominance, Chinese policymakers may wish to make 
reference to the U.S. debates of the 1970s as they related to the impact of 
antitrust policy on national economic dynamism. 
Article 18 of China’s AML establishes parameters for use in 
determining whether an undertaking has a dominant market position, 
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  Id. at 54. 
74
  Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 53; see also William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox 
Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 143 
(1989-90).  
75
  William Blumenthal, General Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Government Policy for Fostering 
Innovation, Remarks at the Global Forum on Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Innovation (Mar. 
28, 2007).  
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including market share,76 “competitive status,”77 and “financial and technical 
conditions.”78  One parameter for determining dominance is “the degree of 
difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant market.”79  
Similarly, Article 17 defines “dominant market position” as a market 
position held by undertakings “that have the ability to control the price or 
quantity of commodities or other transaction conditions in the relevant 
market or block or affect the entry of other business operators into the 
relevant market.”80  Another parameter, “the extent of the reliance on the 
business operator by other business operators in the transactions”81 could be 
applied to a wide range of other situations in which Chinese enterprises must 
“rely” on technology and technical support from foreign firms holding 
proprietary technology. 
Article 19 of the AML establishes an arithmetic formula for use in 
determining whether undertakings hold a dominant market position.  
Dominance can be “presumed” if the market share of one undertaking 
accounts for half of the relevant market,82 the joint market share of two 
undertakings amounts to two-thirds of the relevant market,83 or the joint 
market share of three undertakings amounts to three-fourths of the relevant 
market.84  The law provides that “[a] business operator that has been 
presumed to have a dominant market position shall not be deemed to have a 
dominant market position if the operator can provide opposite evidence,” 
indicating that the inference of dominance is rebuttable.85 
In contrast, U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies do not believe that 
presumptions of monopoly power based on market share alone are 
appropriate or helpful, given the unique factors that characterize different 
product markets.  A firm with a large market share may face robust 
competition and, as a practical matter, may not possess the power to control 
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  AML, supra note 1, art. 18(i). 
77
  Id. at art. 18(i). 
78
  Id. at art. 18(iii). 
79
  Id. at art. 18(v). 
80
  Id. at art. 17.  U.S. antitrust officials have expressed concern that such provisions could be applied 
to a situation in which a U.S. multinational holding proprietary technology refuses to transfer it, thus 
“blocking access” or making it very “difficult” (or impossible) for other undertakings to enter that product 
market. Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Some 
Comments on the Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of China’s Draft Antimonopoly Law, Remarks at the 
UIBE Competition Law Center Conference on Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice (July 21, 2007) 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.htm.  
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  AML, supra note 1, art. 18(iv). 
82
  Id. at art. 19(i). 
83
  Id. at art. 19(ii). 
84
  Id. at art. 19(iii). 
85
  Id. at art. 19. 
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prices or exclude competitors even if it seeks to do so.  One U.S. antitrust 
official indicated that he was “pleased” that in China’s AML “whatever the 
precise percentage market share set forth in the presumption, the respondent 
firm has the right . . . to rebut any presumption [of dominance].” 86  
However, he said: 
[T]he experience in the United States indicates that a market 
share of 50 percent is too low to provide a firm with monopoly 
power.  We generally would not begin examining whether a 
firm has a dominant market position unless it has at least a 60 
or 70 percent market share.  Even when a firm has such a share, 
we examine the actual market situation—including barriers to 
effective new entry, the likelihood of leapfrog competition, and 
the durability of the high market share—to determine whether 
the firm actually has the power to raise price significantly over 
competitive levels.87 
China’s concept of collective dominance of a market by two or three 
enterprises has no parallel in U.S. antitrust doctrine and has been criticized 
by U.S. competition policymakers as lacking an economic rationale.  One 
U.S. official comments that only one scenario exists under which three firms 
with a large joint market share might pose a collective threat to 
competition—when all three collude to limit competition—a scenario which 
can easily be addressed through the application of Articles 13 and 14 of the 
AML, which prohibit monopoly agreements.88  The presumption of 
collective “dominance” by three firms, he said “is unclear and confusing, 
and is likely to harm, rather than promote, competition in Chinese 
markets.”89 
Commercial practices which constitute prohibited “abuses” of a 
dominant position are itemized in Article 17 of China’s AML, and are 
defined in sweeping and general terms.90  U.S. Federal Trade Commissioner 
Pamela Jones Harbour commented in 2006 with respect to these designated 
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  Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Some 
Comments on the Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of China’s Draft Antimonopoly Law, Remarks at the 
UIBE Competition Law Center Conference on Abuse of Dominance: Theory and Practice (July 21, 2007), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/225357.htm.  
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  Id.  
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  Id. 
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  Id.  
90
  AML, supra note 1, art. 17 
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“abuses” that “[e]ach example of abusive conduct is a type of conduct that 
[under U.S. law] will usually constitute legitimate competitive behavior.”91 
Article 17, section (i) of the AML cites as an abuse of a dominant 
market position “selling products at unfairly high prices or buying products 
at unfairly low prices.”92  A senior U.S. antitrust official recently commented 
on this provision: 
I do not believe that high pricing is an appropriate subject for 
antitrust enforcement.  High pricing, standing alone, does not 
harm the competitive process; if anything, it serves as a signal 
and an inducement for other firms to enter the market . . . .  
Second-guessing the unilateral, non-exclusionary pricing 
decisions of dominant firms will lead to price regulation by the 
government, which is not consistent with the market-oriented 
goals of competitive laws.93 
The proscription on selling products at “unfairly high prices” could be 
applied, among other things, to IP licensing fees that are deemed “too high.”  
The prohibition on buying products at unfairly low prices could also be 
applied to inhibit a range of normal pricing practices commonly found in a 
competitive market, such as the use of bulk purchasing power to bargain for 
lower prices94—a practice which U.S.-based retailers like Wal-Mart use to 
secure dramatically lower prices for consumers.  
A second form of prohibited abuse is “[s]elling products at prices 
below cost without any justification.”95  Normally, low prices are an 
indicator of competition, which benefits consumers.  U.S. antitrust doctrine 
recognizes that in extremely rare cases a dominant firm may price below 
cost for a sustained period in order to drive competitors out of the market, 
then raise prices to monopoly levels—so-called “predatory pricing.”96  
However, the U.S. competition agencies have concluded that almost all 
below-cost pricing has a non-predatory explanation, such as clearing out 
inventory, enticing consumers to try new products, or meeting competition 
from other firms.97  Their recommendation to China with respect to this 
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  Pamela Jones Harbour, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Adoption of Trade Regulations in 
China, Scope and Effect: An American’s View, Remarks at the New York State Bar Ass’n International 
Law and Practice Section, Shanghai, China, 6 (Oct. 20, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
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  AML, supra note 1, art. 17(i). 
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  Masoudi, supra note 86.  
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  AML, supra note 1, art. 17 (ii).   
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provision is that it should find that below cost pricing is “without 
justification” only in the narrow range of circumstances in which prices are 
below marginal cost and there is a likelihood that the firm in question will be 
able to recover lost profits later by raising prices after driving competitors 
out of the market.98 
A third form of prohibited abuse is “refusing to transact with a trading 
party without any justifiable causes.”99  This proscription could be applied to 
any situation in which an undertaking decides—for whatever reason—it 
does not wish to enter into a commercial relationship with another 
undertaking, whether with respect to research and development (“R&D”), 
distribution, sales joint manufacturing, or cross-licensing of technology.100  
The stakes are potentially very large if the provision is interpreted to apply 
to the unilateral refusal to license IPR, which is regarded as a fundamental 
right under U.S. law.101  A 2007 report issued jointly by the U.S. Department 
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission stated the agencies’ 
conclusions with respect to unilateral refusals to license patents: 
[Supreme Court] jurisprudence support[s] the traditional 
understanding that the unilateral right to refuse to [license] a 
patent is a core part of the patent grant.  Antitrust liability for 
mere unilateral, unconditional refusals to license patents will 
not play a meaningful part in the interface between patent rights 
and antitrust protections.  Antitrust liability for refusals to 
license competitors would compel firms to reach out and 
affirmatively assist their rivals, a result that is “in some tension 
with the underlying purpose of antitrust law.102 
“Restricting their trading party so that it may conduct deals 
exclusively with themselves or with the designated business operators 
without any justifiable causes” is a prohibited abuse.103  This prohibition 
could be applied to prohibit a wide variety of commercial practices, such as 
exclusive distribution arrangements and cross-licensing of technology. 
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  AML, supra note 1, art. 17 (iii).  
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  A specific example given by SAIC in 2004 of this type of “abuse” was a U.S. multinational, the 
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The AML prohibits dominant firms from “[i]mplementing tie-in sales 
or imposing other unreasonable trading conditions at the time of trading 
without any justifiable causes.”104  This provision does not prohibit tying 
agreements but requires that they be “justifiable” and not involve 
“unreasonable” terms.  Interpreted most broadly, this provision could be 
applied to prohibit virtually any agreement that in some way links the sale of 
a product subject to IPR protection with other products, such as sale of a 
whole computer with proprietary components.  A narrower interpretation 
might approximate U.S. practice, which considers both anticompetitive 
effects and the efficiencies arising out of a tying agreement.  U.S. 
competition agencies are more likely to challenge a tying arrangement if: 1) 
the seller has market power with respect to the tied product; 2) the 
agreement has an adverse affect on competition in the relevant market for 
the tied product; and 3) the efficiency effects do not outweigh the adverse 
affects on competition.105 
The AML prohibits dominant firms from “[a]pplying discriminatory 
treatment on trading prices or other trading conditions to their trading parties 
with equal standing without any justifiable causes.”106  A 2004 survey by 
China’s State Administration of Industry and Commerce suggests invoking 
this provision against multinationals that price their products differently in 
various geographic markets around the world.107 
Finally, there is a catchall category that embraces “[o]ther forms of 
abusing the dominant market position as determined by the Anti-Monopoly 
Law Enforcement Agency.”108  This language vests the enforcement 
authority with discretion to identify other commercial practices that are to be 
deemed “abusive.” 
In 2006, Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, reviewed the practices 
defined as “abuses” by China’s then-draft AML.  He stated: 
Refusals to deal, exclusive dealing, tying and price 
discrimination all can be used for pro-competitive, efficiency-
enhancing reasons and in only very limited circumstances will 
have anticompetitive effects, even when used by a firm with a 
dominant market position.  Indeed, practices such as these are 
very common in highly competitive markets, reflecting that 
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such distribution methods can reduce costs and improve 
efficiency.  Therefore, it is important that these practices not be 
presumed to be anticompetitive, either in the law or by the anti-
monopoly enforcement agency in implementing the law.  These 
practices should be viewed as unlawful only if, after a detailed 
analysis of the conduct, the market, and proffered business 
justifications, it is determined that the conduct harms 
competition by creating, maintaining or strengthening the 
monopoly power of the dominant firm and that the conduct 
makes economic sense to the firm only because of its 
anticompetitive effects.109 
C. Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation 
An aspect of competition policy closely related to market dominance 
is the treatment of IPR, such as patents and copyrights, which confer upon 
the owners a monopoly of limited duration during which to exploit their 
inventions.  Because competition laws commonly prohibit or restrict 
monopolies, the question commonly arises how the seeming inconsistencies 
between IPR and competition rules are to be reconciled.  China’s AML does 
not, by its terms, clarify how China will address this question other than to 
state that the AML will not apply to the exercise of IPR except when IPR is 
“abused” to “eliminate or restrict competition.”110  However, statements by 
Chinese officials have raised concerns that the AML will be applied in a 
manner which will substantially curtail the rights of IPR holders.111  This 
would represent a major and significant divergence from current U.S. 
antitrust policy.  Moreover, the historic U.S. experience with respect to the 
antitrust treatment of IPR suggests that substantial curtailment of IPR by 
rigorous application of the AML would undermine a key long range Chinese 
policy objective, the promotion of innovation in the Chinese economic 
system. 
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Article 55 of the AML provides that it “shall not apply to conduct of 
business operators to exercise their intellectual property rights according to 
the laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property rights.”112  
However, it states that “this law shall apply to the conduct of business 
operators to eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing their 
intellectual property rights.”113  “Abuse” of IPR is not further defined, but 
the provisions of Article 17 of the AML itemizing the forms of “abusing the 
dominant position” include “selling . . . at unfairly high” prices,114 which 
could be applied to IP licensing fees, and “refusing to trade with a trading 
party without any justifiable causes,”115 which could be applied to instances 
of refusal of an IPR holder to license proprietary technologies to 
competitors.116 
Precisely what constitutes an “abuse” of IPR may be clarified by the 
issuance of AML-specific intellectual property guidelines by the Chinese 
government.  In the interim, however, a combination of administrative 
actions, pending legal changes, and statements by Chinese officials have 
heightened foreign concerns with respect to compulsory licensing of 
patented technologies used for national standards, the setting of royalty 
rates, and abuse of IPR generally.  For example, in 2003 and 2004, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) undertook a survey 
and held a series of conferences regarding anticompetitive conduct of 
foreign multinationals and published certain of its findings in its official 
journal.117  In the journal, SAIC expressed concern that there were no laws 
or regulations “enacted in China to deal with such practices as . . . refusal to 
deal through abuse of intellectual property . . .”118 indicating that their 
“technological advantages” were “the most important advantages of 
multinationals.”119  SAIC gave a specific example of an IPR-related “abuse” 
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whereby a U.S. multinational, “the largest manufacturer of network 
equipment in the world,” was “not willing to authorize any other company to 
use its ‘private protocols’ for which it owned patent rights or business 
secrets.”120  Hence, SAIC urged swift enactment of the AML “to complete 
the competition law system and stop the anticompetitive practices of 
multinational companies in a timely manner.”121 
In 2005, Shang Ming, Director of Treaty and Law, MOFCOM, 
reportedly stated that: 
[T]he most extreme [examples of] anti-competitive behaviors of 
multinationals against Chinese enterprises are seen in the abuse 
of intellectual property rights.  But the Anti-Monopoly Law has 
not been promulgated in China so there is no effective measure 
to restrict these behaviors . . . .  As multinationals usually own 
several core technologies or core patents, Chinese enterprises 
have to ask for help in their manufacturing procedures.  And 
some multinationals use their advantageous position to place 
restrictions on their licensing of patents to Chinese 
enterprises.122 
In 2007, an official from the Ministry of Information and Industry 
(“MII”) reportedly spoke in other contexts of breaking “the intellectual 
property monopoly of foreign [companies]” as it related to royalty rate-
setting, an area of frequent tension between foreign IPR holders and 
potential Chinese users of that intellectual property.123  The official echoed a 
statement by another MII official just months earlier who reportedly said 
“[we] oppose the monopoly through intellectual property standards . . . .”124 
The provisions in China’s AML addressing market dominance and 
IPR appear to comprise parts of a broader national effort to promote 
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“indigenous” innovation in China by domestic individuals and enterprises.  
The government has implemented a number of “top down” type measures to 
foster indigenous innovation, such as government funding for R&D, the 
establishment of incentive measures to reward indigenous innovation, and 
the encouragement of foreign technology transfer and absorption by 
domestic enterprises.125  The numerous statements by Chinese policymakers 
about the role of the AML in China’s national innovation effort indicate a 
strong intention to break “foreign monopolies” on existing technologies 
protected by patents and other forms of intellectual property rights.  But the 
experience of the United States—a nation with a strong record of 
innovation—raises questions about the soundness of an innovation policy 
predicated, in significant part, on curtailing the commercial latitude and IPR 
of innovators, whether foreign or domestic. 
The Founding Fathers of the United States placed such importance on 
the promotion of innovation in the new republic that they expressly provided 
for the protection of intellectual property rights in the Constitution.  Article I 
grants Congress the authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”126  Thomas Jefferson, 
himself an inventor who was extensively involved in the administration of 
the early U.S. patent system, commented that “the issue of patents for new 
discoveries has given a spring to invention beyond my conception.”127  
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American inventors 
produced a stream of revolutionary technologies—the steamboat, the 
mechanical reaper, the telegraph, the electric light, the telephone, the 
airplane—and the patent system afforded them the opportunity to reap the 
rewards of their genius. 
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But in the early twentieth century the rise of big businesses—many of 
which had large patent portfolios—became the source of considerable public 
concern.  Big business, it was feared, not only would not innovate but would 
crush the small enterprises that were idealized as the true American 
wellsprings of invention.  President Woodrow Wilson gave voice to a 
common sentiment when he warned that “monopoly . . . always checks 
development” and that the advent of large firms with monopoly power put at 
risk the traditional American genius that had given rise to inventions.128  He 
said that “[th]e instinct of monopoly is against novelty, the tendency of 
monopoly is to keep in use the old thing, made in the old way,” he said.129  
Calling for curbs on monopoly, he asked, “who can say what patents now 
lying, unrealized, in secret drawers and pigeonholes, will come to light, or 
what new inventions will astonish and bless us, when freedom is 
restored?”130 
These popular and political anxieties manifested in U.S. antitrust 
policy.  “During much of the twentieth century, the courts, antitrust 
enforcers, and antitrust practitioners viewed intellectual property with deep 
skepticism.”131  Between 1930 and roughly the mid-1970s, antitrust concerns 
commonly overrode patent rights in court decisions.  “[During this] ‘anti-
patent’ era . . . U.S. policy-makers and regulators remained largely 
suspicious of the power of big business.  The courts generally viewed 
patents as automatic sources of monopoly power and measures were taken to 
weaken patent rights”132—a perspective not entirely dissimilar to that of 
Chinese officials who have expressed recent concerns about “monopoly” of 
intellectual property by multinational enterprises.  Most U.S. patents that 
became the subject of litigation during the “anti-patent” era were declared 
invalid, and one Supreme Court Justice observed in 1949 that “the only 
patent that is valid is one this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”133  
The anti-patent stance of the U.S. competition agencies culminated in the 
promulgation of the Justice Department’s so-called “Nine No-Nos,” setting 
forth fee arrangements and contractual restraints that could not be legally 
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incorporated in technology licensing agreements.134  Some of the Nine No-
Nos are similar to the practices currently cited as “abuses of dominance” in 
China’s AML.135 
The hostility of U.S. antitrust policy toward IPR in the mid-twentieth 
century—particularly in the hands of “big business”—was criticized by 
contemporary analysts.  In a 1952 study the economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith observed that “the showpieces of American industrial progress” 
were primarily “dominated by a handful of large firms,” and that “the 
foreign visitor, brought to the United States by the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, visits the same firms as do the attorneys of the Department 
of Justice in their search for monopoly.”136  In 1966, Richard Hofstadter 
rejected as a “curiosity” the Wilsonian notion that big firms restricted 
innovation, observing that “today the public needs no persuading that it is 
the large corporations, with their programs of research, that are 
technologically progressive.”137  Even Senator Estes Kefauver, long one of 
the most prominent critics of “big business,” conceded in 1958 “that the 
wealth and resources of Du Pont made possible the long years of research 
from which came such developments as cellophane and nylon.”138 
However, a change in U.S. antitrust policy with respect to IPR did not 
occur until the stagflation of the 1970s led to a reassessment of the 
underpinnings of the U.S. economic system.  The Chicago School’s critique 
of U.S. antirust policy placed a major emphasis on what was seen as a 
misguided application of antitrust rules to IPR.  The Chicago economists 
encouraged a reappraisal of the U.S. patent system due to a “general concern 
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about industrial stagnation and a lack of significant technological 
innovations.”139  Their views were reinforced by the findings of an advisory 
committee established by President Carter to examine U.S. innovation 
policy, which concluded that “diminished patent incentive” was contributing 
to U.S. economic stagnation.140 
Changing attitudes were reflected in a series of court decisions and 
policy shifts in the 1980s that fundamentally reoriented the relationship 
between U.S. antitrust and IP protection policies.  Two critical Supreme 
Court decisions, Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Diamond v. Diehr 
significantly expanded the scope of patentable subject matter, with the 
Supreme Court declaring that patentable subject matter can “include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.”141  Also in 1981, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) renounced the “Nine No-Nos” governing IP 
licensing, articulating efficiency-enhancing justifications for the same 
licensing practices that had been treated as per se illegal under the Nine No-
Nos.142  In 1981, a DOJ official outlined how thorough economic analysis 
could result in a finding of pro-competitive effects of certain licensing 
practices whereas incomplete analysis might draw opposite conclusions.143 
The following year Congress created the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, vesting in it exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals of federal 
district court decisions involving patents.  The creation of this new appellate 
court is seen as a watershed in the history of the U.S. patent system because 
it has upheld patent validity with far more consistency than was the case 
with U.S. courts in the “anti-patent” era. 
Finally, in 1988, the DOJ issued the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines 
for International Operations, which reinforced its earlier statements with 
respect to the antitrust/IPR interface.  These were updated in 1995 and 2007, 
but all versions have committed the competition agencies to the continued 
and extensive use of the rule of reason in IPR cases, ensuring that any 
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antitrust challenges to patents and other IPR will be subject to extensive 
economic analysis. 
These changes in U.S. antitrust policy had the effect of significantly 
broadening the exclusive rights of innovators to exploit their inventions—
which arguably fueled the dramatic growth of technology-intensive U.S. 
industries in subsequent decades.  With respect to what were in 1980 
“nascent industries such as semiconductors, software, and biotech,” the 
Supreme Court was “a driving force behind a series of legal precedents and 
legal reforms” that extended more secure patent coverage to new life forms, 
semiconductor designs, software programs, business methods, and 
nanotechnologies.144  Companies in these industries that did not exist or 
were relatively obscure in 1980 have grown to become world leaders in their 
fields.  In certain cases, they are the very “dominant” foreign enterprises that 
worry Chinese policymakers today.  The relationship between the change in 
U.S. IPR policy and the success of these industries was direct.  In the case of 
biotechnology, for example, the 1980 Supreme Court held in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty that biological inventions could be protected by patents.  This 
had dramatic, long-term consequences.  Representatives of the biotech 
industry “generally credited the [Supreme] Court’s decision in Chakrabarty 
as the beginning of their industry without which genetic engineering would 
not have made nearly as much progress.”145  Robert P. Taylor, an expert on 
intellectual property law, testified in 2002 on behalf of the American Bar 
Association Section of International Property Law that “[w]ithout patent 
protection, the venture capital which has been critical in fostering the 
[biotech] industry would not have been available.  This entire industry, in 
which the United States is the clear leader, would have languished.”146 
Today U.S. antitrust authorities recognize that innovation itself is one 
of the most pro-competitive forces in an economy, and that curbs on the 
exclusive rights of innovators deter innovation itself. 
If the inventor [in a discovery] commits funds and the 
investment fails, it absorbs the entire loss; it does not receive 
any subsidy from its competitors.  But if the investor commits 
funds and the investment succeeds, it must now share the 
benefits with its competitors.  An asymmetrical system of this 
type discourages entrepreneurial risk-taking, encourages free-
riding, and becomes what one of our commentators has called 
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“an insurance policy for laggards.”  To assure that investment 
and innovation are not discouraged, competitors must be 
confident in advance that they will not be required to share their 
successful assets with competitors.147 
D. Government Administered Industries 
Until its economic reforms, China’s economy was completely 
dominated by state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), and the government 
exercised pervasive regulatory control over the conditions of competition, 
including pricing, output volume, and market entry and exit.  With the 
progress of these reforms, a dynamic private sector has emerged in many 
parts of the economy and many former state enterprises have been 
privatized.  However, a number of key sectors remain dominated by SOEs, 
and administrative authorities are still extensively involved in regulating 
competition in a number of industries.  The AML makes reference to these 
government-administered industries,148 but the extent to which the terms of 
the AML will be fully applied to them remains uncertain.  Wang Xiaoye, a 
prominent Chinese legal scholar and member of the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Working Committee, warns that “the law provides no answer as to who will 
have priority when conflicts arise between industrial policy and anti-
monopoly legislation . . . .  [This should be clarified and] specifics of 
implementing regulations should be released as soon as possible.”149 
Article 7 of the AML provides that “[t]he State shall protect the lawful 
business activities of undertakings in industries that are controlled by the 
State-owned economy . . . .  [The] State shall supervise and control the price 
of commodities and services provided by these undertakings to protect the 
interest of consumers and facilitate technical progress.”150  SOEs are 
directed to “be self-disciplined” and not to “harm the interest of the 
consumer from a controlling or exclusive dealing position.”151  This 
provision appears to contemplate a continuation of the current practice of 
government-administered pricing in many SOE-dominated sectors.  It is 
unclear from this provision whether SOEs are subject to, exempt from, or 
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2007). 
148
  AML, supra note 1, art. 7. 
149
  Wang Xiaoye, Anti-Monopoly Law, A Tough Start, CAIJING MAGAZINE ANNUAL 101-102 (2008). 
150
  AML, supra note 1, art. 7. 
151
  Id. 
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partially subject to the AML.  They are not included in the list of exemptions 
expressly set forth in Article 15, and Article 7 states that SOEs shall operate 
“in accordance with the law.”  However it is not clear whether this is a 
reference to the AML, to the industry-specific laws that commonly govern 
SOE-dominated sectors (e.g., Energy Law, Electricity Law, Air Law, 
Telecommunications Law, Insurance Law) or to both the AML and such 
other laws. 
Read together with the remainder of the AML, Article 7 suggests that 
there will be, in effect, two competition policy regimes: one characterized by 
government oversight and regulation of enterprise behavior pursuant to the 
AML and the other by direct government administration of pricing and 
enterprise conduct in SOE-dominated sectors pursuant to Article 7 and 
industry-specific laws.  It is entirely possible that the SOE-dominated sectors 
will be subject to more lenient treatment under the AML than those sectors 
in which foreign enterprises play a more important role. 
There is little parallel between China’s AML provisions regarding 
SOEs and U.S. antitrust practice, because state-owned enterprises do not 
play a significant role in the U.S. economy overall.  However, the 
government-owned U.S. Postal Service (USPS) holds a statutory monopoly 
on the delivery of non-overnight first-class mail, outbound international 
mail, and the placement of mail in private mailboxes.152  USPS has long 
been criticized for inefficiency and constantly increasing prices, and some 
argue that private delivery services have performed better in areas they have 
been allowed to enter, such as parcel and express mail services.  Few, if any, 
economists would contend that the U.S. economy would benefit from the 
extension of similar statutory monopolies to other sectors of the economy.153 
Some Chinese observers have embraced a similar perspective and 
called for the AML to be applied fully to SOEs.  During the debates on the 
AML, some NPC members pointed out that SOE monopolies harm 
consumers and should be brought under AML disciplines, with high rates 
charged by the telecommunications industry singled out as a particular 
concern.  “Governmental agencies should stand up for the whole society and 
                                           
152
  The postal monopoly is established in the Private Express Statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1693-99 and 39 
U.S.C. 601-601. 
153
 The Federal Trade Commission recently called for curtailment of the United States Postal Service 
monopoly authority, concluding that its government-related benefits and restrictions hurt the competitive 
mail industry, distort the market, and result in higher prices to the consumers.  U.S. Postal Service Needs 
More Autonomy—FTC Report, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2008). 
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strengthen regulation of SOEs,” said one NPC Standing Committee member 
during the debates.154 
Articles 8 and 32 through 37 of the AML establish constraints on 
anticompetitive acts by administrative authorities and “organizations 
authorized with administrative powers of public affairs by laws and 
regulations.”155  The language regarding organizations vested with 
administrative power was added in the final version of the AML and 
presumably would encompass trade associations, standards-setting working 
groups, and other non-state actors vested with delegated regulatory authority.  
Because of the substantial potential for anticompetitive, restrictive and 
nontransparent actions by such quasi-public entities, this change represents 
an improvement over earlier drafts of AML legislation. 
The sections governing administrative monopolies consist entirely of 
a listing of prohibited actions.156  The AML does not subject administrative 
monopolies to the jurisdiction of AML enforcement authorities.  There are 
no specific penalties established for violation of the prohibitions.  Article 51 
simply provides that administrative agencies and organizations vested with 
authority that commit abuses “shall be admonished by the superior 
authorities,” and that “individuals who are directly responsible shall be 
punished in accordance with law.”157  No procedures are established for 
parties that are adversely affected by the abuse of administrative powers to 
seek relief.  Thus, it is unclear what effect these new safeguards will actually 
have in the market. 
These concerns led Wang Xiaoye, one of the framers of the AML, to 
warn that under this provision, “the anti-monopoly law is like a tiger without 
                                           
154
 Fan long duan fa cao an er shen fan long duan qian lu man man [The Second Reading of AML 
Draft, A Long Way to Go], SHI JIE CAI JING BAO DAO [WORLD FINANCE REPORT], July 12, 2007.  Cheng 
Siwei, Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, warned in 2006 that “the state-owned monopolistic 
enterprises mainly depend on the government for support, with administrative authorities granting them 
privileges and barring others from entering the competition.  Therefore, if we do not combat administrative 
monopoly, there is no way we can fight against economic monopoly,”  Speech Excerpts, supra note 39.  
155
  AML, supra note 1, arts. 8, 32-37. 
156
  Article 32 of the AML provides that “administrative agencies and organizations authorized with 
administrative powers of public affairs by laws and shall not abuse their administrative powers by limiting, 
or limiting in disguised form, organizations or individuals by requiring them to deal, purchase or use 
commodities provided by designated undertakings.”  Article 33 provides that such entities “shall not abuse 
their administrative powers to block regional commodity circulation” by employing specified “behaviors” 
which include, among other things “setting discriminatory charging items, fixing discriminatory prices, or 
implementing discriminatory charging standards for commodities originating from other regions” Id. at art. 
33(i); stipulating technical requirements that differ from those applied to “local like commodities” Id. at art. 
33(ii); taking discriminatory technical measures, such as repeated inspections of commodities from other 
regions Id. at art. 33(ii); and creating administrative licensing procedure aimed at commodities from other 
regions to restrict their access to the local market Id. at art. 33(iii). 
157
  AML, supra note 1, art. 51. 
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teeth when dealing with administrative monopolies.  The combating of 
monopolies cannot be left only to the higher authorities.”158 
Although far less of the U.S. economy was ever dominated by SOEs, 
as recently as the 1980s many U.S. industries were heavily regulated by 
government agencies that exercised control over basic decisions such as 
pricing, output, and market entry and exit.  In some cases, government 
agencies held statutory authority that enabled them to authorize industry 
price-stabilization measures and other cartel-type arrangements.  In the late 
1970s and 1980s, recognizing that this type of industry regulation not only 
harmed consumers but acted as a drag on economic growth, Congress 
enacted legislation deregulating a number of major industries, including air, 
rail, and motor carrier transportation.159  The power of government agencies 
to authorize anticompetitive agreements has largely been abolished, and the 
deregulated sectors are now subject to U.S. antitrust enforcement. 
Deregulation, and the increased competition that has resulted, have 
been important factors underlying the increased dynamism and rates of 
productivity growth that have taken place in the U.S. economy in recent 
decades.160  One comprehensive study of the empirical evidence on the U.S. 
post-regulation experience concluded that “[s]ociety has gained at least $36-
$46 billion (1990 dollars) annually from deregulation,” principally in the 
U.S. transportation (airlines, railway, road freight) sector, but also in the 
telecommunications, cable television, stock broking, and natural gas 
industries.161  The gains achieved through regulatory reform reportedly 
resulted in an approximately seven to nine percent improvement in GNP.162  
Each industry examined dramatically improved productivity and achieved 
real operating cost reductions ranging from twenty-five to seventy-five 
percent, with consumers being the primary beneficiaries, but with labor and 
producers also experiencing a net benefit.163  There is little question that full 
                                           
158
  Wang Xiaoye, supra note 149, at 101-02. 
159
  Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in 
various sections of 49 U.S.C.); Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified in 
various sections of 11, 45, and 49 U.S.C.); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, 49 
U.S.C. §10101. 
160
  Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Promoting a Culture of Competition, 
Remarks before the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Apr. 2006).   
161
  Numerous studies have been conducted on the benefits of deregulation in the U.S.  One such study 
was conducted by Clifford Winston, Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 1263, 1284 (1993). 
162
  Id. at 1284. 
163
  Elizabeth E. Bailey, Price and Productivity Change Following Deregulation: The U.S. 
Experience, 96 ECON. J. 1, 1-17 (1986).  
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application of the AML to China’s SOE-dominated sectors and 
administrative monopolies would bring similar benefits to China’s economy. 
E. Regional Blockades and Other Restrictions 
The AML prohibits a variety of restrictions by regional governments 
to limit trade and investment originating outside the regions themselves.164  
The provision is a response to measures that have been taken by provincial 
governments to restrict the inflow of products from other regions that 
compete with local enterprises.165  The prohibition on regional blockades 
arguably serves a function similar to the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which has been applied to strike down state laws that provide 
for “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that 
benefits the former and burdens the latter.”166  This application of the 
Commerce Clause has been recognized as an essential element of the 
commercial integration of the U.S. economy.167  If the AML is to play a 
similar role in China, it will be necessary for the central government to 
ensure and clarify that these provisions override restrictive measures 
employed by the governments of Provinces, Autonomous Regions, and 
Municipalities.  Zheng Gongcheng, a member of the NPC Standing 
Committee, commented that “[t]he formation of a unified market nationwide 
might be the [most] pressing issue to be addressed by this [Anti-Monopoly] 
Law.”168 
F. Exemptions 
Article 15 of the AML provides exemptions from the basic prohibition 
on monopoly agreements set forth in Articles 13 and 14 “for the purpose of 
mitigating a severe decrease in sales volume or excessive overstock during 
economic recessions.”169  This exemption appears to permit price 
stabilization agreements and joint production and curtailment agreements 
                                           
164
  AML, supra note 1, art. 33-35. 
165
  Cheng Siwei, Vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, noted, 
“Some regions have set up various kinds of barriers blocking the access of products from other regions.  
The case could even be established for the real estate sector in Beijing.  Companies registered in the 
Dongcheng District will have to register another company in the Xicheng District if they want to do 
business in the latter.”  Speech Excerpts, supra note 39.  
166
  Oregon Waste Sys. Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 
1345 (1994). 
167
  Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005). 
168
  Zheng Gongcheng, Member, as reported in Speech Excerpts: Draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law, 
22nd Session of the 10th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (June 30, 2006). 
169
  AML, supra note 1, art. 15(v). 
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during recessions.  The Law also provides for exemptions “for the purpose 
of safeguarding the legitimate interests in foreign trade and foreign 
economic cooperation.”170  By apparently permitting what are arguably the 
most common types of cartel agreements, Article 15 significantly weakens 
the pro-competitive potential of the new law. 
The U.S. has a number of statutory exemptions to the antitrust law, 
many of them enacted in the first half of the twentieth century.171  A recent 
review of U.S. antitrust policy by the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 
a body created by Congress to determine whether the antitrust laws should 
be modernized in light of our global, high-tech economy, concluded that 
“statutory immunities from the antitrust law should be disfavored.”  The 
Commission found that exemptions should be granted rarely, when a clear 
case has been made that the case for the exemption outweighs the benefits of 
competition.172 
G. Trade Associations 
Article 11 of the AML provides that “[t]rade associations shall 
strengthen the self-discipline of undertakings within their industries and 
guide the undertakings to compete in accordance with the law and maintain 
the order of market competition.”173  It is unclear whether this provision is 
intended to encourage industry associations to undertake actions that protect 
consumers or whether it contemplates a role for the associations in 
maintaining “market order” and restricting competition.  Article 16 of the 
AML states that trade associations “shall not organize undertakings within 
their industries to engage in monopolistic conduct prohibited by [Chapter II 
Monopoly Agreements],”174 and Article 46 provides for the levying of fines 
and revocation of registration with respect to violations by trade 
associations.175  However, as noted, Article 15 of the AML exempts many 
forms of collective activity from the general prohibition on monopoly 
agreements, including recession cartels.176 
                                           
170
  Id. at art. 15(vi). 
171
 Examples of U.S. statutory exemption from the antitrust laws include: the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608b-608c; Fisherman’s Collective Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 521-22; 
Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 638(d), 640; Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95; 
and the Anti-Hog-Cholera Serum and Hog-Cholera Virus Act, 7 U.S.C. § 852.  For a more complete 
inventory see ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 24. 
172
  Id. at 335. 
173
 AML, supra note 1, art. 11. 
174
  Id. at art. 16. 
175
  Id. at art. 46. 
176
  See, e.g. ,id. at art. 15(v). 
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Since the 1990s, Chinese trade associations, encouraged by the 
government, have played a major role in facilitating industry-wide price 
stabilization measures, suggesting that notwithstanding enactment of the 
AML, they will continue to play such a role.177  Many of China’s trade 
associations evolved out of the old you guan bumen (“departments-in-
charge”), and are staffed with former ministry officials.  They play an 
important role in carrying out sectoral government policies.  Article 11, like 
Article 7 regarding SOEs, appears to contemplate a continuing government 
administrative role with respect to enterprise decisions on matters such as 
pricing and output levels. 
In the United States, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the 
federal government and some state governments experimented with 
authorizing trade associations to promulgate and enforce industry codes 
limiting competition, effectively suspending the operation of the antitrust 
laws.178  One rationale was that restraints on competition were necessary to 
protect farmers, small businesses and ailing sectors like coal and oil.179  
Pursuant to federal legislation and parallel state and municipal laws, 
barbershops, beauty shops, shoe repair shops, bowling alleys, dry-cleaning 
establishments, and laundries, adopted minimum-price rules.  Used-car 
dealers adopted rules forbidding sales below a “list” price, and similar rules 
were adopted throughout much of the U.S. economy.180  Government and 
business spokesmen adopted a new lexicon: “competition” became 
“economic cannibalism”; antitrust advocates were “corporals of disaster”; 
and the pejorative term “chiseler” came into common use in reference to 
firms that undercut the minimum prices established by industry association 
codes.181 
                                           
177
  This perspective finds support in State Council Notice No. 36 of May 13, 2007, Some Opinions of 
the General Office of the State Council on Accelerating the Promotion of Reform and Development of 
Industrial Associations and Chambers of Commerce, which directs industry associations to form into 
bodies conducting “market supervision,” to formulate and enforce “good behavior rules,” to implement 
“control systems for industry self-discipline,” and to “maintain a market environment for fair competition.” 
178
  The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA), 48 Stat. 195, was enacted to address 
economic distress arising out of the Great Depression.  Among other things NIRA provided for the creation 
of “codes of fair competition” with rules regulating prices, wages and a range of business practices.  NIRA 
created the National Recovery Administration (NRA), which worked with various industry sectors to 
develop and implement the fair competition codes.  The codes were exempt from the antitrust laws and 
enforceable in U.S. courts. 
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  ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 268-78 (Princeton: 
Princeton U. Press, 1966). 
180
  See id. at 263-66; MARK A. FRANKENA AND PAUL A. PAUTLER, ANTITRUST POLICY AND 
DECLINING INDUSTRIES 72-75 (Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, October 1985), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/231948.pdf. 
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  HAWLEY, supra note 179, at 54. 
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Although the U.S. industry codes were often styled as “pro-
competitive,” their basic purpose was anticompetitive, “promot[ing] scarcity 
and thus balanc[ing industry] output and demand, regardless of the 
dislocations that such action might bring in other areas of the economy.”  
Their net effect was to “restrict production, prevent change, hold up prices, 
and bilk the consumer.”  This system of “government-sponsored 
cartelization” not only did not end the Depression, but arguably deepened 
and extended it.  In his seminal study of U.S. Depression-era antitrust 
policies, the political economist Ellis W. Hawley observed with respect to 
the impact of the codes that “[i]n the ‘sick’ industries and the transportation 
field the typical [industry self-regulation] program was designed to arrest 
technological innovation and protect inefficiency, not to encourage 
economic progress or ease the transition to newer, cheaper and more 
productive methods of providing the necessary goods and services.”182 
In the worst case, Article 11 of the AML could foster the spread of 
arrangements in China that resemble U.S. Depression-era industry codes.  In 
its journal article on the anticompetitive practices of foreign multinationals, 
SAIC envisioned a restrictive role for China’s trade associations as they 
interfaced with foreign companies:  “[We shall] help and guide the 
establishment of industrial organizations and associations in the industries 
which involve investment of multinationals, and effectively supervise the 
market competition behaviors of multinationals in these industries through 
industrial organizations and associations . . . .”183  Market regulation of this 
kind by government-sanctioned industry associations would likely produce 
results similar to those experienced in the U.S. in the 1930s: scarcity, high 
prices, fewer choices for consumers, and the inhibition of innovation. 
H. Review of Concentrations 
Article 3 of the AML prohibits “concentrations” of undertakings that 
have or are likely to have the effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition.184  Article 5 provides that “[u]ndertakings may implement 
concentration in accordance with the law through fair competition and 
voluntary combination to expand their business scale and to improve their 
market competitiveness.”185  Articles 20 through 31 establish procedures by 
which Chinese authorities can review prospective mergers and other 
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  Id. at 277. 
183
  Yin Huiming, Discussion of Methods for Monitoring Anticompetitive Behaviors of Multinationals, 
23 J. ADMIN. INDUS. & COM. (2003). 
184
  AML, supra note 1, art. 3(iii). 
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  Id. at art. 5. 
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combinations and disapprove them if the transaction “has or may have the 
effect of restricting or eliminating competition.”186  A rule-of-reason type 
standard is established for review of concentrations, and a problematic 
transaction may not necessarily be disapproved if “the undertakings can 
prove that the positive effects of such concentration on competition 
obviously outweigh the negative effects or that the concentration is in the 
public interest.”187 
Chinese policymakers have expressed concern that in many domestic 
industrial sectors, Chinese enterprises are too small to achieve the economies 
of scale necessary to compete internationally on an equal footing with large 
foreign enterprises.  For this reason, it is unlikely that the AML will be 
applied to domestic combinations in an excessively rigorous manner, 
particularly if there is little or no likelihood that a given combination will 
create conditions of monopoly or otherwise reduce competition. 
Foreign comment on the AML merger review provision has focused 
largely on the extent to which Chinese government review of a merger 
outside of China would be triggered.  The concern was that the draft AML 
established standards pursuant to which notification might be required with 
respect to mergers elsewhere in the world with limited or even no impact on 
China.188  The final version of the AML eliminates statutory thresholds, 
stipulating when a prior notification of a merger or acquisition is required.  
Article 21 now states simply that notification will be required pursuant to a 
“threshold of notification” to be stipulated at a future date by the State 
Council.189  This defers but does not eliminate concerns that the notification 
thresholds will be set too low, giving rise to unnecessarily burdensome 
notification requirements for foreign multinationals that are active in 
acquiring firms around the world.  
U.S. antitrust policy is designed to “ensure that transactions have an 
adequate nexus with the United States by exempting certain foreign 
acquisitions from notification requirements.”190  In addressing U.S. concerns 
over potential Chinese notification thresholds under the AML in 2006, a U.S. 
DOJ official pointed out that in the U.S., acquisition of stock in a foreign 
company is exempt if the foreign firm has less than $57 million in assets in 
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  Id. at art. 28. 
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  Id.  
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  Masoudi, supra note 86. 
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  AML, supra note 1, art.  21. 
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  Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
Key Issues Regarding China’s Anti-Monopoly Legislation, International Seminar on Review of Anti-
Monopoly Law, Hangzhou, China (May 19, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/217612.htm. 
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the U.S. or less than $57 million in sales in the U.S.  He indicated that 
acquisition of stock by one foreign company in another is exempt from 
review if the block of stock concerned does not give the acquiring company 
a 50% or more interest, and that combinations are also exempt if both parties 
are foreign, the value of the transaction is less that $227 million, and their 
combined sales and combined assets in the U.S. are both $125 million.191  
Chinese policymakers may wish to adopt similar guidelines to ensure that 
review is not required of combinations that have little or no nexus with 
China. 
I. National Security Review 
Article 31 provides that, with respect to acquisition of domestic 
undertakings by “foreign capital” as well as “other circumstances involving 
the concentration of foreign capital,” if national security is concerned, an 
examination shall be conducted “according to the relevant regulations of the 
State.”192  This provision contemplates a security-related policy review of 
acquisitions comparable to the scrutiny given inward foreign investment in 
the U.S. by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(“CFIUS”).193  The addition of Article 31 to the AML has created some 
confusion as to whether a new national security review process has been 
created.  As a practical matter, such review occurs already with respect to 
foreign direct investment, and transactions with national security 
implications are likely to be continued under separate procedures as 
before.194 
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  Id.  
192
 AML, supra note 1, art. 31. 
193
  The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States [hereinafter CFIUS] is an interagency 
committee in the U.S. federal government which reviews inward foreign investment policy and specific 
foreign investment transactions which have national security implications.  Chaired by the representative of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, CFIUS was established by executive order in 1975.  Exec. Order 11858(b), 
40 F.R. 20263 (May 7, 1975). 
194
  China’s Catalog for the Guidance of Foreign Investment restricts foreign investment in a range of 
designated sectors including some which have a clear nexus with national security, such as manufacturing 
of weapons and ammunition, processing of radioactive materials, and operation of power networks.  In 
addition, the 2006 Interim Provisions for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors established the need for government approval of foreign investment if the transaction affects 
national economic security, involves a major industry, or might result in the transfer of famous trademarks 
or traditional Chinese brands.  A number of other Chinese laws and regulations also require approval of 
foreign investment transactions, and although national security is not an explicitly stated concern, the 
industries designated suggest a sensitivity to national security.  See generally General Accountability 
Office (GAO), Foreign Investment: Laws and Policies Regulating Foreign Investment in 10 Countries, 
Report to the Honorable Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, United States Senate (February 2008) GAO-08-320, 43-50. 
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The implications of this provision, if any, with respect to inward 
foreign investment remain to be seen.  Most countries, including the United 
States, have rules providing for screening of inward foreign investment on 
national security grounds.  The extent to which such screening constitutes a 
significant impediment to inward foreign direct investment depends on the 
extent to which a particular government associates various industries with 
the concept of “national security.”  Since its entry into the WTO, China has 
permitted extensive inward foreign investment in high-technology industries 
that some other countries have regarded as sensitive.  However, there have 
been recent signs that the government may be moving toward a more 
expansive view of national security and that the AML may play a role in 
addressing national security concerns. 
One recent example involved the soybean processing industry.  A 
State Council official reportedly suggested during an interview with 
reporters and during a trade conference that the soybean industry might be 
protected in various ways, including through the AML, on the basis of 
national security.  “The soybean industry is related to the national economy 
and the people’s livelihood.  It would have an adverse impact on China’s 
macroeconomic control and market stability, it would be a hidden trouble for 
China’s foodstuffs too, if [the soybean industry] were completely 
monopolized by foreign investment . . . .”195  The same official was quoted 
elsewhere as suggesting that China should “formulate a development plan in 
the soybean industry . . . .  First, foreign capital is forming a monopoly in the 
soybean processing industry in China . . . .  In the end, Cheng Guoqiang 
suggests that we should be vigilant for and prevent the overall monopoly of 
multinationals in the soybean industry in China.”196 
U.S. antitrust policy is designed to promote competition regardless of 
the identity, size, or nationality of individual competitors.  To the extent that 
the U.S. government sees economic and/or national security reasons to 
restrict some foreign commercial activities affecting the U.S. market, it does 
so pursuant to separate statutory regimes regulating trade, investment, and 
national security.  To the extent that China uses the AML to address national 
security and other concerns unrelated to competition issues, it will diverge 
from U.S. practice and may reduce rather than promote competition.  For 
example, Chinese officials may disapprove of a proposed merger that raises 
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  Cheng Guoqiang is Director of the Research Institute of Market Economy, Development Research 
Center of the State Council.  The Domestic Soybean Industry Faces Being Nibbled at by Foreign 
Investment, Xinhua wang Fujian pin dao [Xinhua Net Fujian Channel] (June 6, 2006). 
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  Cheng Guoqiang, as reported in Expert Suggests Including Soybean Processing in the National 
Grain Security Emergency System, Jilin Province Grain Administration (July 31, 2006). 
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some anti-monopoly and some national security concerns (and perhaps other 
policy concerns), but which would survive scrutiny on either anti-monopoly 
or national security grounds standing alone.  Such a policy would deter 
market entry by competitors that could otherwise enhance efficiency and 
benefit consumers in the Chinese market. 
J. Administration 
China’s AML provides for the establishment of two anti-monopoly 
organizations.  An “Anti-Monopoly Commission Under the State Council” is 
given a mandate to research and formulate competition policy, assess 
competitive conditions in the market, promulgate anti-monopoly guidelines, 
and coordinate enforcement efforts.197  An “Anti-Monopoly Enforcement 
Authority” is entrusted with enforcing the law directly or through delegation 
of authority to regional and local governments.198  Article 9(iv) provides that 
one of the Anti-Monopoly Commission’s tasks will be to “[c]oordinat[e] 
anti-monopoly administrative enforcement work.”199 
In China, interministerial coordination will be required because a 
number of ministries administer industry-specific laws that will give rise to 
tensions with AML enforcement efforts.  Telecommunications, for example, 
is one of the seven sectors considered by the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (“SASAC”) to be “critical to the national 
economy and national security”200 and over which SASAC intends to 
maintain “absolute control.”201  In October 2007, the MII stated, in its 
People’s Post and Telecommunications News,202 that “because there is some 
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overlap in jurisdiction” between the telecom regulator, MII, and the Anti-
Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority, “the agencies may conflict with one 
another in the conduct of authority.”203  MII argues that the AML 
Enforcement Authority “shall ask for the opinion of the telecommunications 
supervisory agency when investigating competition cases” and that the two 
should cooperate including by trying “to regulate the telecom industry 
together.”  Such statements suggest ministries that have policy agendas not 
exclusively devoted to the promotion of competition may seek a role in 
influencing AML enforcement policy. 
Given the existence of enforcement institutions likely to oppose full 
application of the AML, a key challenge facing the new AML authorities 
will be the advocacy of AML principles within the councils of the Chinese 
government.  In the United States, experience has demonstrated that, in the 
words of FTC Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, “the idea of competition as 
a way to organize an economy often must struggle against other regulatory 
structures that are hostile to free markets.”204  In a famous 1974 address, 
then-Chairman of the FTC, Lewis Engman, pointed out how agencies 
regulating the U.S. transportation industry effectively sanctioned price-
fixing, limited market entry, and in other ways inhibited competition, 
thereby acting as a drag on the U.S. economy.205  Over time, advocacy by 
U.S. competition agencies and economists helped bring about economic 
deregulation in the transportation sector and other regulated areas of the 
economy.206  Underlying this emphasis on institutional advocacy has been a 
recognition that other agencies can adopt regulations that impair competition 
that ordinary consumers are ill-equipped to recognize or to oppose 
effectively.207 
Article 10 of the AML states that the Anti-Monopoly Law 
Enforcement Authority “if appropriate, may empower corresponding 
government agencies at the provincial autonomous region, and municipal 
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level to be responsible for anti-monopoly enforcement activities in 
accordance with this Law.”208  While it is not known whether and to what 
extent this provision will be given effect, the prospect that AML 
enforcement authority might be delegated to regional and local government 
officials with no grounding in competition law or economics is worrying.  It 
could result in inappropriate AML enforcement actions by local authorities 
against foreign firms, influence over AML enforcement by local industry, 
inconsistent legal rulings in different regional jurisdictions, and other 
problems. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
China’s AML is broadly worded and no clarifying guidelines or 
decisions have yet been forthcoming, therefore any analysis of the AML 
must necessarily be tentative and conditional.  In general, China’s enactment 
of the AML, after long deliberation and extensive consultations, stands as a 
formidable achievement and a significant milestone in its progress towards a 
market economy.  The full application of its prohibitions on price fixing and 
other similar anticompetitive practices will be highly beneficial to the 
Chinese economy and consumers.  The areas of divergence from U.S. 
antitrust practice recall an earlier era in the United States, when antitrust was 
an expression of popular anxieties, political and social values, and a system 
of economic regulation.  Hopefully this article, which highlights what appear 
to have been some wrong turns by U.S. antitrust policy in the past, will 
prove useful to Chinese policymakers as they prepare to implement the new 
law. 
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